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CRITERIA EMPLOYED BY APPELLATE COURTS IN
DETERMINING ADEQUACY OF DAMAGES
Although the increasing amount of damages awards' and the
diminution of purchasing power of the dollar2 have stimulated in-
terest in determining the adequacy of awards, little has been added
to the standard for determination expounded by Chancellor Kent
in 1812:
The damages, therefore, must be so excessive as to strike manknd,
at first blush, as being, beyond all measure, unreasonable, and out-
rageous, and such as manifestly shown the jury to have been actuated
by passion, prejudice, or corruption. In short, the damages must be
flagrantly outrageous and extravagant, or the court cannot undertake
to draw the line; for they have no standard by which to ascertain
the excess.3
The same standard is applied to the reverse side of the problem,
although formerly inadequacy of damages was not a ground for a
new trial or reversal.4 Today, it is generally recognized that a verdict
which is so inadequate as to indicate passion, prejudice, partiality,
corruption, disregarded instructions, or mistake, will be set aside or
reversed. 5 Inadequacy or excessiveness are also indicated where the
verdict bears no reasonable relation to the harm suffered by the
plaintiff. 6
When confronted with the problem of excessive or inadequate
damages, the courts rather uniformly hold that their function is
limited to reviewing the discretion of the trial court in granting
or refusing a motion for a new trial.7 The reason for this uniform
position of the courts is that the award for damages is peculiarly
a question of fact for the jury, subject to the discretion of the trial
judge.8 Whether the appellate courts rule on discretion, as they
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
graphs in the courtroom during the progress of judicial proceedings
or during any recess thereof and the transmitting or sound-recording
of such proceedings for broadcasting by radio or television introduce
extraneous influences which tend to have a detrimental psychological
effect on the participants and to divert them from the proper ob-jectives of the trial; they should not be permitted.
Tis suggested wording of the canon satisfies the demand that the exclusion
be justified on grounds of psychological interference.
IE.g., Gallick v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 178 N.E. 2d 382 (Ohio 1961), aff'd,
83 Sup. Ct. 659 (1963).2 Belli, The Adequate Award, 39 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1951).
3 Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns (N.Y.) 44, 52, 6 Am. Dec. 253, 258
(1812).
4 Grodsky v. Consolidated Bag Co., 324 Mo. 1067, 26 S.W 2d 618 (1930).
5 See generally 15 Am. Jur. Damages §231 (1938).
6 ltid.
7 Annot., 16 A.L.R. 2d 3, 20 (1951).
8Tlid.
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assert, or on the actual question of amount, they have set up certain
criteria as guides in reaching decisions.9 These criteria are quite the
same in passing on claims of excessive as well as inadequate awards.10
In order of discussion, they are: precedent, nature and extent of the
injury, pain and suffering, loss of wages, diminution of earning
power and expenses.11
Precedent
Since all personal injury cases are decided on their own particular
facts and circumstances, any attempt to make one damage award
binding precedent for another case of similar circumstances is
absurd.' 2 No matter how similar cases may appear, they all differ
in some respect.' 3 While courts generally concede that precedents are
of little value in these determinations, they also recognize the need
for some degree of uniformity in damages awards,14 and the method
employed in seeking this uniformity is a consideration of past cases
and awards. When engaged in this comparison of past and present
awards, -the court must take into consideration the difference in the
purchasing power of money during the period of time between the
cases. 15
If the cases are similar in most repects, precent may be of some
value as a rough guide in determining the adequacy of the award.
An attempted review of cases to point up uniformity would be futile
since most cases differ in several respects. This will become apparent
in the discussion of other criteria.
Nature and Extent of the Injury
In personal injury litigation, the nature and extent of the injury
is an enormous subject. However, its discussion must be of limited
scope in this paper. The nature or type of an injury can be classi-
fied on an anatomical basis.16 This classification is complicated by
the different ways in which each part of the body could be injured.
Furthermore, the possibility of multiple injuries to different parts
of the body adds to the likelihood that no two injuries will be
identical.
9 Annot., 16 A.L.R. 2d 893, 401 (1951).10 Jjnd.
"1 Schweitzer, Trial Manual for Negligence Actions 19 (2d ed. 1951).
12 Central Truckaway System v. Moore, 304 Ky. 533, 201 S.W 2d 725
(1947).
IsBruner v. Gordon, 309 Ky. 29, 214 S.W 2d 997 (1948).
14 Annot., 16 A.L.R. 2d 3, 28 (1951).
15 E.g., Hedges v. Neace, 807 S.W 2d 564 (Ky. 1957).16 For a collection of cases classified by anatomy, see 15 Am. Jur. Damages
U§211-28 (1938).
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Simply stated, the relevant considerations are the severity and
permanancy of the disability.17 Generally, the courts in considering
the nature and extent of an injury for the purpose of determining
adequacy, must employ reasonableness in light of past cases. An
example of this method of evaluation is provided by a comparison
of several cases of similar injuries to the head, but with differing
degrees of severity and permanency.
In one case, the plaintiff suffered a 15-20 per cent disability, result-
ing from a blow on the head. The use of a neck brace was necessary
for five months. A verdict of $10,800.00 was held not excessive in light
of the permanent nature of the injuryis In another case, the plain-
tiff also received a blow on the head, but failed to establish any
permanent disability, or show any medical expenses. Here, the court
held that an award of $500.00 was excessive.19 In both cases, the
court relied heavily on the permanent or temporary nature of the
injuries, ruling in one case that a large verdict was reasonable, and
in the other case that a small verdict was excessive. In a third case,
the plaintiff, a woman, received a concussion causing permanent
pains and a slight nervous disorder. A verdict of $5,130.00 was held
not excessive.2 0 So, in a review of three cases of head injury, it is
seen that the nature and extent of an injury is carefully scrutimzed
by the court in determining, not only the permanent or temporary
nature, but also the degrees and gradations of severity of the injuries.
Pan and Suffenng
Possibly the most difficult of all damages awards to evaluate in
dollars and cents is the pain and suffering the plaintiff has experi-
enced and will experience in the future. While the jury is relatively
free to determine amounts for pain and suffering, they are limited to
an award that is reasonable in proportion to the injury and the proof
of pain and suffering.2 '
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has held a $50,000.00 verdict
for pain suffering from a "whiplash" injury to be grossly excessive
and to be obviously the result of the jury's urge to punish the de-
fendant company for having knowingly operated a vehicle with
faulty brakes.22 In this case permanent disability was not proved,
nor was there any proof of future suffering. The court stated there
17 15 Am. Jur. Damages §210 (1938).
18 Crutcher v. Hicks, 257 S.W 2d 589 (Ky. 1953).
19 Bene v. Talley, 269 S.W 2d 185 (Ky. 1954).2 0 Lomsville Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Crane, 262 S.W 2d 188 (Ky. 1953).
2 1 Bene v. Talley, 269 S.W 2d 185 (Ky. 1954).
22 Field Packing Co. v. Denham, 842 S.W 2d 524 (Ky. 1961).
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was no general formula for measuring pain and suffering other than
reasonableness, free from sentiment or fanciful standards, and with-
out punitive motives.
Of course, no market value can be established for pain and suf-
fering, and no amount of money is going to remove it. 2 3 The func
tion of the jury is to decide upon a sum which, in its discretion, will
reasonably compensate the plaintiff for his entire discomfort. 24 This
sum also includes humiliation and embarrassment, which are ele-
ments of pain and suffering.25
Where it is not definitely stated by the jury that an award is
for pain and suffering, appellate courts look to the entire award and
subtract from it actual and special damages which are proved. The
remaining figure, if there are no punitive damages, represents the
amount the jury awarded the plaintiff as compensation for his suf-
fering, past and future. Appellate courts usually show a reluctance
to reverse an award on grounds of inadequacy or excessiveness. This
reluctance is even more prevalent where the award is for pain and
suffering. Nevertheless, in one case the Kentucky Court of Appeals
reversed a $25,000.00 judgment for pain stating that, while it was
primarily the province of the jury to determine what award the
plaintiff should receive for his pain and suffering, the verdict was
obviously the result of passionate reasoning.26 The court further
stated that the question was not what sum of money would be
sufficient to induce a person to voluntarily undergo the pain suffered
by the plaintiff, but rather, what amount under the circumstances
was reasonable compensation for the suffering necessarily endured
and to be endured.
Other jurisdictions have treated this problem with much the
same standards employed by the Kentucky court. In a New York
case, when instructing on damages for pain and suffering, the trial
judge made this charge to the jury- "I know of no arbitrary rule that
you can apply in determining the amount except your own
sound sense and good judgment as men and women of affairs."2 7
Quite similar to the position of Kentucky and New York is this charge
from a Pennsylvania court: "The law gives you no yardstick or no
footrule by which to measure pain and suffering. All that it can do,
and all that it does, is to award reasonable compensation for pain
2 3 Darnels, Measure of Damages m Personal Injury Cases, 7 Miani L.Q.
171 (1953).
24 2 BeMi, Modem Trials 1622 (1954).
25 Ibid.
26 Standard Oil Co. v. Tierney, 92 Ky. 367, 17 S.W 1025 (1891).2 7 Poliam v. Scribia, 281 App. Div. 1071, 122 N.Y.S. 2d 54 (1953).
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and suffering." 28 Following the same line of reasoning in a recent
Florida case, the court reversed a judgment of $300,000.00 as exces-
sive.29 After subtracting the actual damages, there was a remainder
of $207,000.00 for pain and suffering which the court flatly ruled
excessive as obviously the result of sentiment or fanciful standards.
However, the court refused to rule what would be considered reason-
able compensation in this case.
From this limited review of cases, it seems that the various courts
tend to employ similar standards in considering compensation for
pain and suffering. Notwithstanding the various words and phrases
applied to these situations, it is obvious that most courts will not
uphold an award for pain and suffering which seems out of propor-
tion to the injuries suffered by the plaintiff.
Because present pain and suffering is fraught with uncertainty
and speculation, it is difficult to reach a conclusion with any cer-
tainty regarding future pain and suffering. But, as a general rule, it is
necessary that the plaintiff show with certainty or reasonable prob-
ability that this future pain will result.30 Some jurisdictions hold
that in order to recover for future pain it is necessary to show that
the injury is permanent.31
The Kentucky Court of Appeals early recognized recovery for
future suffering, if from the evidence the plaintiff had established
with reasonable certainty that he would endure future suffering for
any proven period of time.3 2 Closely following this decision, in an-
other case33 the court stated:
Both precedent and principle allow one who has been injured by
the negligence of another, regardless of the permanency of the in-
Jury, to recover damages for such mental and physical suffering as
he has sustained, or as it is reasonably certain that he will there-
after sustain as a result of the injury.3 4
This requirement of reasonable certainty stems from the established
rule that uncertain or speculative damages are not recoverable.
Several jurisdictions have for some time held that all awards for
future pain and suffering must be reduced to present worth m
a manner similar to that used in figuring awards for loss of earning
2 8 Cimmo v. Laub, 157 Pa. Super. 871, 43 A. 2d 446 (1945).2 9 Loftin v. Wilson, 67 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 1953).30 Nussbaum v. Caskey, 235 Ky. 640, 32 S.W 2d 18 (1930).
31 E.g., Reid v. Yellow Cab Co., 131 Ore. 27, 279 Pac. 635 (1929).
82 Moses v. Proctor Coal Co., 166 Ky. 805, 179 S.W 1043 (1915).
3 3 Richmond v. Hill, 195 Ky. 566, 242 S.W 867 (1922).
84 Id. at 569, 242 S.W at 869.
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power.85 This is the "present worth" method. However, the Kentucky
court has held to the contrary on pain and suffering, stating that
the situation was not analogous to loss of earning power, and that the
jury was simply to give a "full award," z.e., a sum designed reasonably
to compensate the plaintiff for future suffering.36 The court reasoned
that at best the present worth method was highly speculative and
would serve only to confuse the jury. Whether the "present worth"
or "full award" method is used, the life expectancy of the plaintiff
should be considered. 37
Some jurisdictions have reduced the computation of pain and
suffering to mathematical "exactness," setting a figure for each day
and multiplying by the plaintiff's life expectancy. Kentucky is among
these jurisdictions.38 While a reduction to mathematical exactness
may at first appear absurd, it does not differ from figuring the life
expectancy and awarding a lump sum without breaking it down to a
day by day consideration. Admittedly, fixing a price for each day's
suffering is difficult, but it is just as difficult to "guess" the value of a
year's worth of suffering.
As this review indicates, it is virtually impossible to establish
a definite standard for evaluation of pain and suffering. There is a
trend toward more exact methods of computation, but the best
summation of the rulings of the various courts is that a wronged
plaintiff is entitled to recover an amount reasonably calculated to
compensate his mental and physical pain, past and future, includ-
ing embarrassment and ridicule. Verdicts will be reversed as excessive
or inadequate where it appears that the jury has resorted to senti-
ment or fanciful standards in determining its award.
Loss of Earnings
Contrary to compensation for pain and suffering, awards for
loss of wages or earnings can be computed with reasonable certainty
in most cases. The simplest formula is merely to subtract what the
plaintiff earned while incapacitated by the injury from the amount
he would have earned but for the injury. If the plaintiff earned
nothing during this period, his recovery is the amount he can prove
he would have earned.
85 Gleason v. Lowe, 282 Mich. 800, 205 N.W 199 (1925); Rigley v. Pnor,
290 Mo. 10, 233 S.W 828 (1921); Slbpp v. United Stage Lines, 192 N.C. 475,
185 S.E. 339 (1926).
SGLomsville & N.R.R. v. Gayle, 204 Ky. 142, 263 S.W 763 (1924).3 7 Annot., 28 A.L.R. 1177, 1181 (1924).
3s Loumsville & N.R.R. v. Mattingly, 318 S.W 2d 844 (Ky. 1958).
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Some states do not distinguish between loss of wages and impair-
ment of earning power.3 9 The practice of allowing one sum for
both elements of damage is usually referred to as the Massachusetts
rule.40 Since measuring the impairment of earning power is more
speculative than figuring lost wages, the better rule is to make sep-
arate awards for the damages sustained.
Complications arise where the plaintiff is unemployed at the
time of the injury, or where the plaintiff's employer continues to pay
his salary. Some courts handle the unemployment situation by hold-
ing that the measure of lost wages is what the plaintiff could have
earned, not what he would have earned.4' Some other courts take
a more realistic view, holding if nothing is lost, nothing can be re-
covered. This problem could be lessened if the length of time the
plaintiff was unemployed and opportunities for employment during
that period were taken into consideration. Where the employer con-
tinues to pay the injured party, or where he is indemnified by insur-
ance, the majority of courts, including Kentucky, hold that the de-
fendant should not be allowed to take advantage of this, and the
recovery should not be diminished.42
On the issue of earnings, especially where the plaintiff is attempt-
ing to prove what money he could have earned if he was able to
work, courts admit much testimony in regard to plaintiff's wages,
salaries, professional fees, past commissions, etc., in order to give the
jury a basis upon which to compute lost earnings.43 As a general rule,
courts will not reverse the jury on this point unless the award is
clearly contrary to the evidence. 44
Impazrment of Earning Capactty
Complementary to the loss of earnings prior to the trial is the loss
of future earnings or ability to earn. This is a major item of recov-
ery in most cases of permanent injury. Generally stated, the measure
of damages for impairment of earning capacity is the difference
between the amount the plaintiff was capable of earning before the
injury and that which he can earn thereafter.45 In contrast to earn-
ings lost before trial, the award for impairment of future earning
capacity is based on what the plaintiff was capable of earning, rather
39 Doherty v. Ruiz, 802 Mass. 145, 18 N.E. 2d 542 (1939).
4o lnd.
41 Millmore v. Boston Elevated Ry., 198 Mass. 870, 84 N.E. 468 (1908).4 2 Louisville & N.R.R. v. Carothers, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1673, 66 S.W 385 (1901).
43 McCormck, Damages §87 (1935).44 E.g., Wrenn v. Burch, 314 Ky. 844, 236 S.W 2d 924 (Ky. 1951); Pick-
enng v. Simpkins, 271 Ky. 288, 111 S.W 2d 650 (1938).45 W A. Wickliffe Coal Co. v. Ryan, 241 Ky. 537, 44 S.W 2d 525 (1941).
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than what he earned before the injury.40 Hence, an unemployed
plaintiff may recover for impairment or diminution of earning power
even though he has never been engaged in a compensable occupation.47
The generally accepted method of arriving at a figure for loss
of earning power is as follows: (1) estimate how long the plaintiff
will live or would have lived but for his injuries; (2) estimate the
yearly income of the plaintiff but for Ins injury; (3) multiply esti-
mated life expectancy by the yearly income for a figure to represent
total income; (4) estimate what the plaintiff can earn with his in-
jury and subtract that from the estimated total income; (5) subtract
(4) from (3) and discount the remainder to present value by using
annuity tables.48
The use of mortality tables in determining life expectancy has
long been accepted by American courts.49 The Kentucky court rec
ogmzes the use of mortality tables, not only in figuring loss of wages,
but also in determining the amount of pain and suffering5 0 The courts
generally allow the use of these tables but hold that they are not
conclusive, and evidence of the plaintiff's general health, employment,
habits, and other facts which may affect life expectancy are ad-
missable.51
After determining a reasonable life expectancy for the plaintiff,
the jury must estimate his yearly income. This, as noted before, is
based on ability to earn, and not solely on what the plaintiff was
earning at the time of the injury. After multiplying the life expec
tancy by the average income and subtracting the amount that the
jury believes the plaintiff is capable of earning in the future, there
remains but one step to bring the verdict within the usual bounds.
This is to reduce the award to present value. This is accomplished
by discounting, at the present legal rate,52 the figure which repre-
sents the plaintiff's total lost earning power.53 Where the award for
impairment of future earning capacity is deemed to be excessive,
it is often due to the failure of the jury to reduce the amount to
present worth.54 It may be noted that the Kentucky Court of Appeals
will not allow impairment awards over the same period of time during
46See 25 C.J.S. Damages §87, n. 65 (1941).47 Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Wright, 231 Ky. 713, 22 S.W 2d 108 (1929).48 Danels, supra note 23.49 E.g., McManus v. Jarvis, 128 Conn. 707, 22 A. 2d 857 (1939).
50 Loisville & N.R.R. v. Mattingly, 318 S.W 2d 844 (Ky. 1958). See also
Life Expectancy and Annuity Tables in Volume 3, Ky. Rev. Stat.51 E.g., Greer v. Louisville & N.R.R., 94 Ky. 169, 21 S.W 649 (1893);
McCaffrey v. Schwartz, 285 Pa. 561, 132 Atl. 810 (1926).52 Ky. Rev. Stat. §360.010 (1963).
58 E.g., Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Kimbrell, 334 S.W 2d 283 (Tex. 1960).
54 Fee generally 25 CJ.S. Damages §87 (1941).
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which loss of earnings are recovered since this is a form of double
recovery55 Courts also will reverse the verdict if they are of the opimon
that the jury, in estimating the amount the plaintiff would have
earned, was moved by passion to set the amount which does not
reasonably represent the plaintiff's past earning capacity. 56
In reviewing the cases of diminution of earning power, it may
be concluded that the sum allowed for the loss of earning power is
subject to reversal or revision where it appears that the jury was
moved by passion, where there is an error in computation, or where
the formula used by the jury does not meet with the approval of the
appellate court.
Actual Expenses
Actual expenses usually include such items as doctor's fees, hos-
pital expenses and medication. Of course, all these expenses must
be incurred as a result of the injury. While these items of expense
appear to be definite, a few complications are involved. A plaintiff
may introduce into evidence all the expenses he has incurred as a
result of the injury, but the amount of his recovery will be the
reasonable value of the expenses, and not necessarily the actual ex-
penses.ST Therefore, it is not enough to simply introduce what the
expenses were, but also evidence to show the reasonableness of the
expenses.
In Kentucky, the litigation of expenses incurred is scarce, but
as a general rule these awards will not be tampered with as long as
they are consistent with the proof. 58 The Kentucky court has upheld
an award of the exact expenses shown by the plaintiff.5 9
Conclusion
The courts have resorted to consideration of various factors in their
determinations of excessive and inadequate damages, and from a
review of cases and authorities, it is doubtful that they will abandon
this method. However, where the cases differ so greatly, this method
is more practical than a hard and fast rule which would have to be
compromised and confused with each new case.
Philip B. Austin
55 McLellan v. Threlkeld, 279 Ky. 114, 129 S.W 2d 977 (1939).
56 St. Lowns Southwestern Ry. v. Ferguson, 182 F. 2d 949 (1950); Mo.-
Kansas-Tex. Ry. v. Webb, 229 S.W 2d 204 (Tex. 1950).5 7 Outland v. Payer, 285 Ky. 492, 81 S.W 2d 752 (1930).
58 Carney v. Scott, 334 S.W 2d 346 (Ky. 1960).59 Greyhound Corp. v. Dowling, 334 S.W 24 259 (Ky. 1960).
